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A FRESH VIEW ON THE HARD/SOFT LAW DIVIDE–
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY OF
ENTERPRISE GROUPS
Irit Mevorach1
It is the orthodox belief that treaties and—within the EU—directly applicable regulations
represent hard, binding international law, while other international instruments - including
model laws - are forms of soft law. In a previous publication2 I discussed how the traditional
distinction between hard and soft law is less firm, due particularly to economic and
behavioural implications of instrument choice and design. Building on that analysis, this
article focuses on the new rules for the international insolvency of enterprise groups in the
Recast EU Insolvency Regulation 2015 (“the EIR”) and in the forthcoming UNCITRAL model
law on enterprise groups. Contrasting the instruments and using a multi-layered assessment
illustrates the blur between hard and soft law. This article argues that only on the first layer—
the agreement to participate in the international instrument—the EIR (chapter on groups) is
robustly harder than the UNCITRAL instrument. On the second and third layers—enforcement
of the instrument and the agreement on hard, more complete, rules within it—the UNCITRAL
instrument is almost as hard or even harder than the EIR, and, as such, more promising. The
article also provides certain concrete conclusions regarding the way that regional and global
regimes may be hardened in the future to meet the challenges of enterprise groups’
insolvencies.
INTRODUCTION
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2 I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford University
Press 2018).
2Policy and law makers, in both regional and international fora, have struggled for quite
some time to agree on efficient solutions for the cross-border insolvency of groups. While the
enterprise group is a prevalent business structure, it comes about in different arrangements,
each which may require different solutions.3 Furthermore, the economic reality of business
integration of many group enterprises may require some form of group solution during their
insolvency, including through high level of concentration of the proceedings, to promote
solutions that can maximize value for stakeholders. Such an approach, however, may raise
concerns about interfering with the “corporate form”4 and with state control over local entities.5
In recent years, much focus and deliberation concentrated on this problem, largely
driven by lessons from the 2007-09 global financial crisis.6 New international instruments have
(finally) emerged as a result. On the EU level, a new revised regulation governing cross-border
insolvency came into force in June 2017 - EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (2015)
(hereinafter “EIR”).7 The new EIR contains a chapter dedicated to enterprise groups.8
Internationally, since 2013, building on the general UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency (“MLCBI”)9 and previous work on the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide,10
UNCITRAL Working Group V11 has been deliberating on an instrument (a model law) for the
cross-border insolvency of enterprise groups (hereinafter “MLG”).12
3 Group enterprises may range from closely controlled vertical structures to more decentralized, horizontal forms
and may operate with different levels of integration. See I. Mevorach, Insolvency within Multinational Enterprise
Groups (OUP, 2009), ch 1.
4 The notions of corporate separate personality and limited liability.
5 See I. Mevorach, Insolvency within Multinational Enterprise Groups (OUP, 2009), ch 2.
6 Where it was evident that the cross-border insolvency system had insufficient tools to deal effectively with the
collapse of group enterprises, the most notable example being the insolvency of the Lehman Brothers group (see
JM Peck, ‘Cross- Border Observations Derived from My Lehman Judicial Experience’ (2013) 30 Butterworths J
Intl Banking & Fin L 131).
7 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency
proceedings (recast).
8 EIR, Chapter V. The original EIR (Council Regulation 1346/ 2000, of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings,
2000), following the approach adopted in its previous form as a convention, did not contain specific rules
regarding groups: ‘[T]he Convention offers no rule for groups of affiliated companies (parent-subsidiary
schemes). The general rule to open or to consolidate insolvency proceedings against any of the related companies
as a principal or jointly liable debtor is that jurisdiction must exist according to the Convention for each of the
concerned debtors with a separate legal entity. Naturally, the drawing of a European norm on associated
companies may affect this answer.’ (M Virgos and E Schmit, ‘Report on the Convention on Insolvency
Proceedings’ (1996) 6500/1/96, REV1, DRS 8 (CFC), [76]).
9 The MLCBI provides the general framework for cross-border insolvency and includes provisions on access,
recognition, relief and cooperation concerning single debtors. It does not provide explicit rules concerning groups.
10 Part Three of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, on the treatment of enterprise groups in
insolvency (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on
Insolvency Law, part three, 1 July 2010).
11 See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/5Insolvency.html.
12 The MLG and the Guide to Enactment of the MLG are still in draft form but deliberations are in final stages
(see -A/CN.9/WG.V/LIV/CRP.1/Add.3, Draft report of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on the work of its
3Would these new instruments now oblige countries and their implementing institutions
to adopt and follow provisions that support efficient solutions for groups? The assumption is
that the EIR, which is regarded a hard, binding international law, will provide the stronger
commitments compared with the MLG, which as a model law is considered “soft law”and thus
weaker.13 This article argues, however, that on a closer look, and against the backdrop of a
more in-depth analysis of what is hard or soft law, the MLG is as hard or even harder than the
EIR where it is more complete and where it provides a wider set of tools and remedies. By
contrasting the EIR and the MLG, it is possible to draw more nuanced conclusions regarding
what in the instruments require hardening and where the challenges are going forward.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I provides relevant background concerning the
nature of hard and soft law. It notes the growing importance and advantages of so-called soft
law, which can in fact exhibit characteristics of hard law and can be more effective in resolving
complex international law problems. Part II unearths the challenges in reaching international
agreements on hard instruments concerning the cross-border insolvency of groups, such that
can lead to optimal solutions. Against this backdrop, Part III evaluates and contrasts the EIR
and the MLG. It highlights the strength of the MLG, which is regarded a soft law instrument,
especially when compared with the regime agreed in the EIR (which is a hard law instrument).
The Conclusion provides certain concrete suggestions regarding the way both the regional and
global regimes may be hardened in the future to meet the challenges of enterprise groups’
insolvencies.
I WHAT IS HARD OR SOFT INTERNATIONAL LAW?
fifty-fourth session (Vienna, 10–14 December 2018 (“draft report”); draft Guide to Enactment provided in
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.162, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group V (Insolvency
Law) Fifty-fourth session Vienna, 10-14 December 2018, Enterprise group insolvency: guide to enactment of the
draft model law (as contained in A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.161) Note by the Secretariat). The references in this Article
to articles in the MLG are to the draft MLG provided as an Addendum to the draft report which will be posted on
UNCITRAL.org website (on file with author). It is expected that the draft MLG and the Guide to Enactment will
be finalized in the next Working Group session in May 2019 (only minor changes are anticipated including in the
numbering of the provisions) and that they will be submitted to UNCITRAL for adoption in July 2019.
13 It has been noted for example regarding the MLCBI that “… a soft law solution was pursued at the time as the
most expedient alternative, especially in view of the state of law and practice at the time, but that a convention
was never ruled out and was considered by some as a desirable long-term solution” (Note by the IBA Insolvency
Section Delegation to UNCITRAL Working Group V
<https://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Insolvency_Section/Insolvency_Section/Projects.aspx#uninsolvencyconvention>
fn 19). See also R. Bork, Principles of Cross-Border Insolvency Law (Intersentia 2017) 10.
4Several specific legal sources are considered “hard,” binding international law.
Importantly the international treaty,14 is a primary source of international hard law.15 Within
the EU, regulations as well are key sources of hard international law.16 Regional regulations as
forms to foster inter-state coordination and promote a “proper functioning” of an internal
market17 are even harder than treaties in terms of their binding force when they do not require
ratification or transformation into domestic law and are supported by an institutional
framework that promotes uniformity.18
Other instruments such as guides, recommendations, and model laws, are understood
as forms of non-binding “soft” law.19 Soft law is a general term that may refer to a variety of
quasi-legal, non-binding rules, instruments and processes used in international relations by
countries and international organizations. As such, soft law is contrasted with hard law, which
is, under this divide, always binding.20 Conventionally, soft law is considered a weakened
version of hard law, with diminished levels of bindingness, obligation, and precision of the
rules. In contrast, hard law presumably gives parties enforceable rights, which can be invoked
by application to a court or tribunal and provides complete and comprehensive rules with
detailed terms that all participants can uniformly follow.21 The reciprocity enshrined in treaties
is also recognized as a “force” that induces compliance.22
The general perception in international insolvency contexts follows this traditional
divide. A treaty for cross-border insolvency is believed to be the ultimate, ideal solution, even
14 The Article refers to “treaty” and “convention” interchangeably.
15 The binding force of treaties is recognized by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states
that ”a treaty is one of the most evident ways in which rules binding on two or more States may come into
existence, and thus an evident formal source of law” (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Article
26). The treaty is considered one of the three primary sources of international law, the other two being customary
international law and general principles recognized as law. See generally H Thirlway, The Sources of International
Law (OUP 2014) 1– 3, 11.
16 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.2.1.pdf.
17 See EIR, recital 3.
18 See Section III(B) below.
19 I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford University
Press 2018) 141, referring to AE Boyle, ‘Soft Law in International Law Making’ in MD Evans (ed), International
Law (4th edn, OUP 2014) 120, and, in the context of international financial regulation, to C Brummer, Soft Law
and the Global Financial System, Rule Making in the 21st Century (CUP 2015) 120–23)).
20 I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford University
Press 2018), 141, referring to AE Boyle, ‘Soft Law in International Law Making’ in MD Evans (ed), International
Law (4th edn, OUP 2014) 119-20.
21 I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford University
Press 2018), 141, referring to AE Boyle, ‘Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law’ (1999)
48 ICLQ 901, 902–04.
22 I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford University
Press 2018), 139-40, referring to AT Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (OUP
2008) 42–45.
5if it cannot be currently achieved. A treaty regime has been equated in this respect with the
concept of “pure universalism” – the presumably ideal way to address cross-border insolvency
through a single forum applying a single insolvency law.23 In contrast, a model law, which is
perceived as a form of soft law is thought to be an interim alternative for governing cross-
border insolvency.24 However, in a previous publication,25 I have pointed to the prominence of
so-called soft law in various international law sub-systems,26 and to international law
scholarship highlighting how soft law may be harder than treaty law (or other forms of binding
international law) in important ways.27 Instruments that are formally considered hard
international law, or provisions within them, can be characterized, de facto, as soft (even
though formally binding) because of their vagueness, indeterminacy, or generality.28 Further,
the binding nature of hard international law is sometimes merely theoretical, where in practice
hard law instruments are often ignored by countries.29 Vagueness in treaty or regulation
provisions may also undermine their enforceability.30
The rigid divide between hard and soft law and between treaties/regulation and other
less formal instruments ignores the variety of so-called hard law instruments, on the one hand,
and the relevance of soft law to law-making, on the other. Soft law enables the development of
23 See e.g., K Nadelmann, ‘Bankruptcy Treaties’ (1944) 93 U Pa L Rev 58, 60–61; JL Westbrook, ‘A Global
Solution to Multinational Default’ (2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2276, 2287, 2292.
24 A note by the International Bar Association (IBA) delegation to UNCITRAL Working Group V from January
2016, stated: “Some who were present when the Model Law CBI was first pursued explained that a soft law
solution was pursued at the time as the most expedient alternative, especially in view of the state of the law and
practice at the time, but that a convention was never ruled out and was considered by some as a desirable long-
term solution.” (Note by the IBA Insolvency Section Delegation to UNCITRAL Working Group V based on an
article by Gregor Baer, Insolvency Section Co- Chair, published in Business Law International (January 2016):
‘International Insolvency Convention: Issues, Options and Feasibility Considerations’ (with the publisher’s
permission) <
file:///C:/Users/Irit/Downloads/IBA%20Submission%20UNCITRAL%20re%20Insolvency%20Convention%20
May%202016.pdf >). fn 19) (emphasis added).
25 I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford University
Press 2018), ch 4.
26 Including international financial law (see CM Bruner, ‘States, Markets and Gatekeepers: Private-Public
Regulatory Regimes in an Era of Economic Globalisation’ (2009) 30 Mich J Intl L 125, 172; C Brummer, Soft
Law and the Global Financial System, Rule Making in the 21st Century (CUP 2015) 120).
27 See e.g. AE Boyle, ‘Soft Law in International Law Making’ in MD Evans (ed) International Law (OUP 2014)
121; CM Chinkin, ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law’ (1989) 38 ICLQ
850; KW Abbott and D Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000) 54 Intl Org 421.
28 I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford University
Press 2018), 141, referring to CM Chinkin, ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International
Law’ (1989) 38 ICLQ 850, 851) who notes that a treaty with vague or weak requirements may be characterized
as “legal soft law”.
29 I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford University
Press 2018), 142, referring to AT Guzman, ‘Against Consent’ (2012) 52 Va J Intl L 747, 752–53; Brummer, Soft
Law and the Global Financial System (n 81) 141.
30 I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford University
Press 2018), 142, referring to CM Chinkin, ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International
Law’ (1989) 38 ICLQ 850, 863–64.
6international norms through more relaxed processes. Although assumed to be non-binding,
such laws can be concluded with high degree of precision and can generate a strong
compliance-pull where they are negotiated by representatives of many countries and where
various economic forces, including concerns about reputation, induce participants to comply.31
The cost of hard law instruments like treaties may also be high especially where the
international agreement aims at resolving complex problems between multiple participants.32
Treaties typically entail a long and cumbersome negotiation and a ratification process that may
ultimately undermine the project.33 The binding character of hard law may involve sovereignty
costs and countries may be reluctant to relinquish powers.34 Agreement on hard law to resolve
international problems can also present significant hurdles in view of extant biases and bounds
on decision-making, highlighted by behavioural international law scholars.35 In reality
perceived losses loom larger than perceived gains and departing from existing endowments is
disliked.36 Therefore, the sovereignty costs (i.e. the perceived loss of sovereignty) associated
with treaties or other hard laws may have a larger effect than might be expected. Relatedly,
even if a treaty framework provides important benefits, a status quo bias37 may slow or impede
31 In certain circumstances, soft law may be even more effective than traditional hard law (I Mevorach, The Future
of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford University Press 2018), 142, referring
to C Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System, Rule Making in the 21st Century (CUP 2015), 145–
47; 180-1).
32 I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford University
Press 2018), 144, referring to AT Guzman, ‘Against Consent’ (2012) 52 Va J Intl L 747,764–65; BC Matthews,
‘Prospects for Coordination and Competition in Global Finance’ (2010) 104 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting
(American Society of International Law) 104, International Law in a Time of Change 289, 292.
33 Indeed, there have been various attempts to conclude treaties on cross-border insolvency, which have failed
(see I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford
University Press 2018),, 130 et seq.).
34 I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford University
Press 2018), 144, referring to KW Abbott and D Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000)
54 Intl Org 421, 436.
35 Drawing on “prospect theory” (A Tversky and D Kahneman, ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases’ (1974) 185 Science 1124; D Kahneman and A Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions under
Risk’ (1979) 47 Econometrica 263), the field of “behavioural international law” reveals the potential influence of
cognitive biases in international law contexts, including regarding negotiating treaties (see e.g., A van Aaken,
‘Behavioral International Law and Economics’ (2014) 55(2) Harv Intl L J 421; T Broude, ‘Behavioral
International Law’ (2015) 163 U Pa L Rev 1099; J Galbraith, ‘Treaty Options: Towards a Behavioral
Understanding of Treaty Design’ (2013) 53 Va J Intl L 309).
36 The “prospect theory” has revealed the robust effect of “loss aversion” where perceived utility is increased less
by gains than by averted losses (D Kahneman and A Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions under
Risk’ (1979) 47 Econometrica 263, 265–69).
37 The tendency to prefer to stick to the current position and avoid change (see D Kahneman, JL Knetch, and R
Thaler, ‘Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion and Status Quo Bias’ (1991) 5(1) Journal of
Economic Perspectives 193).
7initiatives to agree to or ratify such an instrument where any change from the status quo may
be unattractive.38
Within the EU, which operates as a semi-federal system with pooled sovereignty, the
institutional setting allows regional institutions to formulate rules. Those rules are directly
applicable in the domestic systems, thus overcoming—or bypassing—at least some restraints
on decision-making: direct applicability removes the requirement that domestic policy and law-
makers adopt the rules.39 Yet, even directly applicable regulation requires a negotiation process
that may entail substantial compromises. The negotiators themselves might not be able to
escape their own status quo biases, especially when negotiating a hard harmonization
instrument that more rigidly constrains states than soft instruments. An example of the
difficulty of negotiating hard law instruments is the long and cumbersome process to agree on
a European form of company (the Societas Europaea) that resulted in scaling down the project
from full harmonization to an agreement on limited uniform rules.40
The perception of instruments as hard law can therefore be misleading because they can
be quite permissive in application. Parties are more likely to be suspicious of hard law
instruments given their traditional binding nature. The hard aspects of regulations (or indeed
treaties) can make them sites of more contestation, which can result in less precise agreements
and laxer commitments. Thus, international instruments that are perceived as soft can function
in hard ways, while international instruments that are perceived traditionally as hard can
function in soft ways. The implication is that we must look beyond the traditional labels of hard
and soft instruments and instead look at the character of the instruments in substance and in
practice. Specifically, and contrary to traditional thinking, the soft law approach to solving
complex international problems may be more effective. It may produce more complete and
strong commitments than may be agreed via conventional hard law instruments.
II THE PROBLEM WITH INTERNATIONAL GROUPS
38 See I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford
University Press 2018), 146 et seq.
39 Guzman notes that “the EU represents perhaps the single greatest example of international cooperation on
political, social, and economic issues the world has ever seen. It is also an exception to the normal requirement of
consent for state-to-state collaboration. The modern EU was made possible only because political processes were
created that allow for non-consensual decisions” (AT Guzman, ‘Against Consent’ (2012) 52 Va J Intl L 747, 751).
40 For a comprehensive description of the process of negotiating the SE legislation, see M. Cristina di Luigi, ‘An
invasive top-down harmonisation or a respectful framework model of national laws? A critique of the Societas
Europea model‘ [2008] ICCLR 58.
8International group insolvency poses a complex problem of an international character;
devising and agreeing upon an effective legal international instrument to address this problem
is unsurprisingly a challenge. Enterprise groups are comprised of separate entities that are
nonetheless connected through ownership, control, or coordination.41 Although legally split
into separate entities, groups are often economically, administratively, or financially integrated
and therefore require some form of global group approach. A coordinated response to
international insolvency of enterprise groups is critical for ensuring value maximisation for the
benefit of the enterprise stakeholders. Generally, in the private international law of insolvency,
harmonization and uniformity across jurisdictions is necessary to avoid the “chaos” generated
by conflicting rules and to allow for a fair and efficient global collective process.42
Agreeing on optimal levels of “universalism,” i.e., a global approach to multinational
default, is difficult, however. Often the best solution in cross-border insolvency, including in
cases involving groups, is concentrating proceedings in one country to create a “procedural
consolidation” of the process.43 Many groups which face financial difficulties have been at
least to some extent integrated in the ordinary course (because due to the economic integration
of the group the insolvency of one entity affects the rest of the group, or because the group’s
integrated business as a whole faces financial or operational distress). Therefore, a “group
solution” is required: a liquidation, reorganization, sale, or a form of restructuring that
encompasses the group as a whole or relevant parts thereof. In special circumstances, it is also
necessary to allow forms of “substantive consolidation”44 if the group was heavily integrated
in terms of its assets and/or liabilities.45 Generally, a global collective cross-border insolvency
process can ensure non-discrimination between foreign and local creditors, better control of
costs, and the ability to consider solutions that can increase value. In the absence of a global
41 UNCITRAL defines an enterprise group as “two or more enterprises that are interconnected by control or
significant ownership” (UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part III, Glossary, 4(a)).
42 “Collective” in a broad sense: “A proceeding should not be considered to fail the test of collectivity purely
because a class of creditors’ rights is unaffected by it” (MLCBI GEI, para 70; MLCBI, art 2).
43 Namely, administration of the process under the same court and supervisor and contemplation of a group
solution. See J Sarra, ‘Oversight and Financing of Cross-Border Business Enterprise Group Insolvency
Proceedings’ (2009) 44 Tex Intl L J 547, 558; I Mevorach, ‘The Home Country of a Multinational Enterprise
Group Facing Insolvency’ (2008) 57 ICLQ 427, 433 et seq.
44 Namely, mixing of assets and/or debts together.
45 I Mevorach, Insolvency within Multinational Enterprise Groups (OUP 2009), 215 et seq. See also J Sarra,
‘Oversight and Financing of Cross-Border Business Enterprise Group Insolvency Proceedings’ (2009) 44 Tex Intl
L J 547, 566 et seq.; J Sarra, “Maidum’s Challenge, Legal and Governance Issues in Dealing with Cross-Border
Business Enterprise Group Insolvencies” (2008) 17(2) Int. Insolv. Rev. 73; S.L. Schwarcz, “Collapsing Corporate
Structures: Resolving the Tension Between Form and Substance” (2004) 60(Nov.) Bus. Law. 109; S Madaus,
‘Insolvency proceedings for corporate groups under the new Insolvency Regulation’ IILR 2015, 235, 247.
9collective approach, countries may avoid cooperation and they may race to collect, fearing that
others will do the same.46
Negotiators of international instruments and domestic implementing institutions may
be concerned, however, about the possible prospective loss of control to foreign bodies, about
limiting sovereignty, and about disempowering local courts.47 Even when countries are inclined
to accept universalism, there remains the potential for a prisoner’s dilemma—the fear that other
countries will not commit to the same approach—and thus an unwillingness to enter into an
agreement.48
A paradox exists: countries recognize the need for an international approach buttressed
with widespread commitment, yet countries have reason to be suspicious and avoid entering
into such commitments.49 Notwithstanding these difficulties, “modified universalism” provides
a proper solution. Modified universalism refers to norms concerning jurisdiction, choice of
law, recognition, relief, and cooperation that enable efficient levels of centralization or
coordination.50 Through experience and peer effect,51 modified universalism has become the
dominant approach for addressing cross-border insolvency.52
But modified universalism is not uniformly accepted—there have been deviations and
pushback.53 “Territorialism” persists; some states continue to prefer, or at least conduct, state-
46 See JL Westbrook, ‘Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum’
(1991) 65 Am Bankr L J 457, 466, arguing that universalism can resolve the insolvency collective action on the
global level. But of course, on the global level it may be more difficult to restrict a “race to collect” and the ring
fencing of assets in the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms.
47 See Tung F, ‘Fear of Commitment in International Bankruptcy’ (2001) 33 Geo Wash Intl L Rev 555, 573.
48 Tung F, ‘Is International Bankruptcy Possible?’ (2002) 23 Mich J Intl L 31, 60 et seq.
49 As Professor Guzman has noted, it is not very challenging to reach consensus and create optimal international
arrangements on simple matters where countries’ interests are aligned (Guzman observes that such matters may
not amount to international “problems” at all). On other matters, for example when participants are faced with a
“prisoner’s dilemma”, or with regard to “global commons” problems, cooperation, even if beneficial, can be
frustrated and it may be difficult to resolve serious international issues especially if insisting on hard laws based
on consent and strict processes. See AT Guzman, ‘Against Consent’ (2012) 52 Va J Intl L 747, 764-67, 775.
50 See J.L. Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default’ (2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2276; I Mevorach,
The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford University Press 2018),,
14 et seq.
51 Increasingly international actors, policy makers, courts, or other authorities, have had interaction with and
exposure to their peers in other jurisdiction through deliberations in international forums and cooperation in
insolvency cases, acclimating countries to universalist and cooperative norms (see I Mevorach, The Future of
Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford University Press 2018), 74-76). It has
been shown that people’s choices can be significantly influenced by the choices of peers and that there is social
and psychological benefit from meetings others’ expectations (see e.g. E Asch, ‘Effects of Group Pressure upon
the Modification and Distortion of Judgments’ in H Guetzkow (ed), Groups, Leadership and Men; Research in
Human Relations (Carnegie Press 1951); R Goodman and D Jinks, ‘How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law’ (2004) 54 Duke L J 621, 640–41).
52 Ibid, 32 et seq.
53 The notable example from recent times is the English Supreme Court approach expressed in the case of Rubin
(Rubin and another v Eurofinance SA and others and New Cap Reinsurance Corporation (in Liquidation) and
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by-state administration of cross-border insolvency proceedings.54 In these cases, concerns over
loss of control, loss of other powers, and status quo biases seem to override the potential gains
that cooperation would provide. These fears about the loss of sovereignty and control are likely
over-weighted,55 yet they remain a hurdle for those committed to developing an effective
universalist solution. Avoiding modernization and movement towards universalism is also
influenced by inequality of systems and problems of institutional capacity, which also affect
trust between systems.56
These international apprehensions are further mixed with and exacerbated by other
fears when coordination involves enterprise groups. A group solution can minimize costs,
maximize value, and ensure fairness, including in circumstances where assets have been moved
around the group without proper record-keeping. The concern, however, is that when allowing
group solutions, the integrity of the corporate form may be at risk—specifically the economic
benefits of the limited liability structure.57 When dealing with cross-border insolvency of
groups such concerns exist in the background, including when negotiating instruments, even
though not every group solution interferes with limited liability (i.e. mixes assets or debts as
part of the solution). A “fear of the unknown” may also be in play as countries have limited
experience in this field. It has been shown in experiments on decision-making that people are
more risk averse when making choices based on described probabilities as opposed to decisions
based on information learned through experience.58 In many domestic systems, laws
concerning group insolvency do not exist, and what generally prevails is an “entity law”
approach, namely the consideration of each entity in a group separately for various legal
purposes.59 It has been very taxing in the past to agree on tools for international group
another v AE Grant and others [2012] UKSC 46) where the court refused to enforce an insolvency-related
judgment that emanated from the main proceedings.
54 See I.F. Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (OUP 2005) 11; LM LoPucki, ‘The Case for
Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy’ (2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2216, 2218.
55 See n [36] above.
56 See I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford
University Press 2018), 71, 183 et seq.
57 Including the saving of transaction and monitoring costs when assets and liabilities are segregated and creditors
may only monitor the financial situation of the entity with whom they are dealing, knowing that they will not
compete with creditors of other group entities (see H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, The Essential Role of
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000)).
58 See R. Hertwig and I. Erev, ’The description–experience gap in risky choice‘ Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Vol.13 No.12 (2009) 516-523; E.A. Ludvig, M.L. Spetch (2011) ‘Of Black Swans and Tossed Coins: Is the
Description-Experience Gap in Risky Choice Limited to Rare Events?’ PLoS ONE 6(6); C.R Madan, E.A. Ludvig,
& M.L. Spetch (2017) ‘The role of memory in distinguishing risky decisions from experience and
description’ Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 70, 2048-2059.
59 This is contrasted with “enterprise law” which is concerned with the economic reality of the overarching
business enterprise and the possible matching of rights or responsibilities to its collective economic function. See
A.A. Berle Jr, ‘The Theory of Enterprise Entity’, 47 Columbia Law Review (1947) 343; C.M. Schmitthoff, ‘The
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insolvencies, and often the problem of the corporate form was raised in international
negotiations even where it was not really at issue.60 International insolvency of groups is
therefore a problem where international coordination and agreement on strong commitments
proves generally difficult.
III EU vs UNCITRAL: EVALUATION OF THE INSTRUMENTS FOR
INTERNATIONAL GROUPS’ INSOLVENCIES
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the international instruments designed
for group are generally quite soft. But the approach in the EIR (which is regarded a hard law
instrument), in particular, represents a compromise with soft elements, likely a result of states’
apprehension and concerns about perceived costs of traditional hard law. The EIR is directly
applicable and has mechanisms to ensure uniform enforcement, but its rules for groups are
somewhat hollow and limited. UNCITRAL requires that its model (the MLG) be adopted.
However, it has other means to induce participation. The MLG’s more relaxed processes has
allowed it to develop a more comprehensive regime for enterprise groups. Even though it is
regarded a soft law instrument, it is overall stronger than the EIR regime.
A. Country Participation
The EIR is undoubtedly hard international law in terms of the obligation to adopt its
provisions. As it is a regime provided in the form of EU Regulation, governed by the provisions
of the main EC Treaty, it is directly applicable in all member states.61 An EU regulation is
binding in its entirety from the time it enters into force and does not require any process of
transposition into domestic law.62 As such, regulations are more robust than treaties. Indeed,
the EU cross-border insolvency regime had been originally contemplated in a treaty,63 but in
that form was ratified by only one country.64 A later effort to conclude an EU Convention also
Wholly Owned and the Controlled Subsidiary’, Journal of Business Law (1978) 218; P.I. Blumberg, ‘The
Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corpora-tions’, 15 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (1990) 283.
This situation of absence of rules on group insolvencies in domestic laws is gradually changing, importantly
following the guidance in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (see note [10] above; legislation has been introduced
for example in Germany, Argentina, and Romania).
60 For example, when Working Group V has deliberated in the past on the notion of a group coordination centre
or group COMI (see Section III(C)(2) below).
61 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.2.1.pdf. Denmark is an exception as it is in a special
position regarding legislation such as the EIR enacted under arts 61(c) and 67(1) of the EC Treaty (see I.F.
Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (OUP, 2005) 357).
62 Cf. the EU Directives, which are also binding, but require a process of adoption and allow member states to
choose the form and method of implementation of the directives’ rules; see
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.2.1.pdf.
63 The European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy, Istanbul, 5 June 1990.
64 See I.F. Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (OUP, 2005) 315.
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failed because not all participating states eventually singed it.65 The relaunch of the EU cross-
border insolvency project as a Regulation overcame the complications associated with treaties
as the regime could now be directly applicable in all member states. The change in the
instrument’s nature also ensured that adoption is of the entire framework.66
The EU regime applies only within the EU and the chapter on groups therefore concerns
entities (members of groups) with a “centre of main interest” (COMI)67 in the EU only. In terms
of country participation, the restriction to EU-COMI entities is a key drawback of the EIR, as
enterprise groups may span across several jurisdictions and not all may have their entities’
COMIs present in EU Member States.68 In contrast, the MLG has the potential to govern any
group where its member entities are located in MLG party countries.
However, the MLG applicability depends on adoption of the instrument by countries.
The need to adopt the instrument is its main soft characteristic. The EIR is robustly stronger
than the MLG in that regard where it is directly applicable in member states’ laws. If the MLG
is not adopted by a significant amount of countries, it will be difficult or in certain
circumstances impossible to cooperate and coordinate group solutions where important aspects
of the group may be in countries that are not party to the regime.69 There is also a risk that
countries adopt the MLG in different ways, undermining uniformity.
The MLG is, however, not so soft even in terms of inducing participation by countries.
The choice of a model law rather than legislative provisions, recommendations or principles
promotes participation because a model law is generally perceived and developed as a law for
adoption in its entirety, encouraging participation in the complete scheme.70 Indeed, the Guide
to Enactment of the MLG explicitly states that “in order to achieve a satisfactory degree of
65 Deliberations on a European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings lasted more than thirty years (ibid,
343-6).
66 Cf. The Istanbul Convention 1990 which allowed reservations from various important chapters (see Fletcher ()
317).
67 EIR, article 3.
68 The EU regime is also susceptible to regional turmoil like the UK decision to leave the EU (Brexit).
69 The solutions envisaged by the MLG are described and assessed in Section III.C below.
70 Cf. the use of recommendations in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, which are provided
as guidance to legislators but do not intend to create a complete insolvency law for uniform adoption. Thus, the
decision of UNCITRAL (Working Group V) in May 2018 to recharacterize the instrument on cross-border
insolvency of groups (the MLG) from “model provisions” to a “model law” hardened it significantly. The report
of the Working Group’s May 2018 meeting notes that ‘‘[t]he prevailing view was that the text should be prepared
as a stand-alone model law, in the light of its distinct scope. That approach, it was noted, would accord more
prominence to the text and facilitate its promotion, as well as highlighting its importance for cross-border inter-
State cooperation and coordination in insolvency-related matters.” (A/CN.9/937, Report of Working Group V
(Insolvency Law) on the work of its fifty-third session (New York, 7–11 May 2018, para 48).
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harmonization and certainty, States may wish to make as few changes as possible when
incorporating the Model Law into their legal systems.”71
Adoption of a model law is also quite simple and certainly simpler than adopting a
treaty, which is often subject to a cumbersome ratification process. A model law is enacted like
any other domestic law and requires minimal legislative efforts as the law is “ready-made” and
can be adopted almost as it is.72 Indeed, the general model law on cross-border insolvency (the
MLCBI) has been so far adopted—usually with limited modifications—in more than forty
countries.73
B. Enforcement
The EIR is also on its face much harder than the MLG in terms of the regime’s
enforcement mechanisms. The EIR’s provisions are “strong” where they are part of the national
regulation. They supersede contradicting national laws and they take effect within the national
legal order.74 It is required that they have uniform effect, which is further guarded by the
delegation of interpretive powers to an international tribunal, the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU).75 The EIR is also premised on the notion of “mutual trust,” which
facilitates the system of compulsory recognition under the regime.76 The MLG, on the other
hand, is regarded as non-binding and it is not supported by an institutional framework with
international tribunals that can ensure consistent compliance.
Once domestic legislators adopt and implement the MLG, however, the model law and
its provisions become part of the domestic legal order. The provisions are then laws (hard laws,
like any domestic law) and are enforceable through domestic mechanisms. Additionally,
uniformity is enhanced by the requirement in the MLG that when it is interpreted “regard is to
be had to its international origin and to the need to promote uniformity in its application . . .”77
A Guide to Enactment of the MLG,78 and a system of collecting and disseminating case law on
71 MLG draft Guide to Enactment (n 12 above), para 13.
72 See I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford
University Press 2018), 154 et seq.
73 See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html.
74 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.2.1.pdf. See also Fletcher, Insolvency () 355 (“all national
courts and officials are required to give effect to them.”)
75 Ibid.
76 See EIR 2015, recital 65. See also CG Paulus, ‘The ECJ’s Understanding of the Universality Principle’ (2014)
27(5) Insolv Int 70.
77 See draft MLG, art 7.
78 See n 12 above.
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UNCITRAL texts79 assist as well in ensuring uniform application. UNCITRAL may also issue
an interpretation guide in the future if the need arises.80 Further, although trust among
participants cannot be presumed within the global framework, it can certainly develop over
time through subsequent practice and interaction.81
The risks of inconsistent enforcement and noncompliance still exist. The application of
the general cross-border insolvency framework (the MLCBI) in cases of groups has not been
fully consistent where some courts took account of the group circumstances and promoted
group solutions while others were more inclined to consider each entity in a group separately.82
But this is precisely why it was important to design a specific model law for groups that
provides explicit solutions and safeguards. It is expected that when the MLG is enacted such
inconsistencies will be reduced.
A risk of inconsistent enforcement exists regarding the EIR too. There are already
indications that, although the EIR is directly applicable, there have been “startling” differences
in its adoption by member states, which may affect the way the EIR may be enforced.83
Additionally, not all issues arising in the course of international insolvency may be referred to
the CJEU, especially as problems of insolvency often require a resolution in real time.84
Importantly, vagueness or laxity of the rules in the instrument can decrease enforceability and
the rules on groups in the EIR are indeed quite lax, as discussed next.
C. Hardness of the Rules
Both the EIR and the MLG provide a toolkit of solutions for cross-border insolvency of
groups, which attempts to promote cooperation, centralization, and/or coordination of the
79 UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT) is maintained by the UNCITRAL Secretariat with the purpose of promoting
international awareness of the legal texts formulated by the Commission and to facilitate uniform interpretation
and application of those texts’ (<http:// www.uncitral.org/ uncitral/ en/ case_ law.html>).
80 Cf. the Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the MLCBI which was revised in 2013
(http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013-Guide-Enactment-e.pdf) as a
result of uncertainties regarding the application of the notion of COMI.
81 See I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford
University Press 2018), 180 et seq. Experience also show that domestic courts often endorse or rely on the
jurisprudence of other countries that have adopted the MLCBI.
82 See I Mevorach, ‘On the Road to Universalism: A Comparative and Empirical Study of UNCITRAL Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency’ (2011) 12 EBOR 517, 537 et seq.
83 See CERIL REPORT 2018‐1 on Insolvency Regulation (Recast) and National Procedural Rules, 4 June 2018 
(http://www.ceril.eu/publications/publicatie-1/).
84 The classic example was the Daisytek group saga (for the judgment of the English High Court see Re Daisytek-
ISA Ltd, and others [2003] BCC 562), which was not referred to the CJEU, but where at least initially the English,
French and German courts reached different decisions concerning the ability of the group members incorporated
in France and Germany to be subject to main proceedings in the UK (see I.F. Fletcher, Insolvency in Private
International Law (OUP, 2005), 388 et seq.).
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process. In important respects, however, the MLG provides stronger tools and a more
comprehensive regime. Indeed, whilst a model law is increasingly understood as a prominent
instrument for cross-border insolvency, it is at the same time still perceived less threatening
than “binding international law.” That more nuanced perception seems to have worked to limit
concerns to some extent and achieve stronger commitments. As explained below, both the EIR
and the MLG regimes impose similar cooperation duties and avoid contemplating a
compulsory centralized process in a single group centre (group COMI). The MLG, however,
has a stronger coordination tool with a wider range of relief and mechanisms to limit multiple
proceedings.
1. Cooperation Duties
Cooperation between courts and insolvency representatives is the first tool provided in
the MLG and in the EIR (Chapter V on groups) for resolving international group insolvencies.
It is also only the cooperation which is mandatory under the instruments.85 The EIR requires
that insolvency representatives cooperate and communicate with each other to facilitate the
effective administration of group members’ proceedings to the extent that cooperation is not
incompatible with the rules applicable to the proceedings and that there is no conflict of
interest.86 The courts must also cooperate and communicate where such cooperation is
conducive to an effecting administration of the process.87 The MLG requires that courts
cooperate to the maximum extent possible with other courts, foreign representatives and any
group representative appointed,88 and that insolvency representatives supervising group
members proceedings cooperate too, including with other courts.89
The instruments do not require that cooperation culminate in any prescribed result,
though. It is only required to consider group-wide solutions against the backdrop of the general
objective to promote “[f]air and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies
concerning enterprise group members . . .”90 or “ensure the efficient administration of
insolvency proceedings relating to different companies forming part of a group of
85 Unless group members have their COMI in the same place in which case centralization may be mandated, see
Section III.C (2) below.
86 See also S. Madaus, ‘Insolvency proceedings for corporate groups under the new Insolvency Regulation’ IILR
2015, 235, 238 (noting that this language should “not be interpreted as an excuse not to engage in any kind of
cooperation across borders at all.”)
87 EIR, article 57. The cooperation duty is also extended to the interaction between insolvency representatives and
courts (EIR, article 58), and between insolvency representatives and a coordinator where appointed (EIR, article
74; on the notion of the “coordinator” see Section III.C(3) below).
88 Draft MLG, Articles 8-11; see on the concept of “group representative” in Section III.C(3) below.
89 Draft MLG, articles 12 and 13.
90 Draft MLG preamble (d).
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companies.”91 Under the EIR, for example, cooperation may lead to the conferral of additional
powers to one of the insolvency representatives resulting in greater concentration of the
process. Representatives are obliged to cooperate, but they “may” (or may not) agree on such
deference and grant of powers.92
Like in single entity cross-border insolvencies, cooperation in group cases is crucial.
The instruments emphasize that it is a duty. Both instruments are, however, quite light
regarding the results of cooperation and here they lean towards what is called “cooperative
territorialism”- where each jurisdiction may administer the assets or the insolvency of a
subsidiary located within its own borders separately but may still cooperate including through
entering into agreements.93 The lack of required outcomes weakens the utility of a duty to
cooperate and what is required from courts and representatives in this respect is rather vague
and limited. The result of applying the cooperation tool might therefore be suboptimal.94 Both
instruments, however, provide additional mechanisms which may lead to greater centralization
and coordination of group solutions.
2. Centralization Through Grouping of COMIs
Neither the EIR nor the MLG envision a notion of “group COMI” (a center of main
interests of a group) or “group forum” where all the proceedings against group members (or
members of certain groups exhibiting a centralized/integrated structure) must be opened.
UNCITRAL Working Group V did consider the notion of group COMI in the past.95 It was
acknowledged that centralization and avoidance of parallel proceedings can reduce costs, assist
in coordination of sales, and in maximization of value, including through global reorganization
of the group. This is particularly true where there is high integration between group members.96
91 EIR, Recital 51.
92 EIR, article 56(2).
93 LM LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach’ (1999) 84 Cornell L
Rev 696, 742–43.
94 See e.g. the opening and conduct of the process concerning the Air Berlin/Niki group (which took place after
the entry into force of the new EIR), where an inefficient process and litigation took place, and parallel
proceedings opened both in Germany and Austria, notwithstanding the effort of the German representative to
concentrate the process in Germany and to open both the proceedings against the parent and the subsidiary in the
same place. While a German district court decided to open main proceedings regarding both the German parent
and the Austrian subsidiary, following objections the German regional court repealed the decision of the first
instance court (Amtsgericht Charlottenburg, Nichtabhilfebeschluss vom 4. January 2018, Aktenzeichen 36n IN
6433/17) and as a result, main proceedings were opened in Austria regarding the subsidiary (on January 12, 2018)
and additional secondary proceedings in Germany.
95 During deliberations that commenced in 2006 on the expansion of the Legislative Guide to address the treatment
of enterprise groups (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on
Insolvency Law, part three, 1 July 2010, pp 83 et seq.).
96 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Treatment of Corporate
Groups in Insolvency, U.N. Doc.A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.76/Add.2 (Mar. 6, 2007), 11; U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade
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It was difficult, however, to reach a consensus on the meaning and location of the group COMI.
The concern was also that such a concept will not be adopted and recognized widely.97 In the
EU, it was previously recommended in a report of the EU Parliament produced during the EIR
revision process98 to identify a group center where proceedings will be centralized
(consolidated procedurally) in circumstances of groups that have a centralized structure.99 In
the more exceptional cases of heavily integrated, intermingled groups, the report recommended
to allow a form of substantive consolidation.100 These recommendations were not adopted in
the revised (recast) EIR.
Still, it is possible under the EU and UNCITRAL regimes to centralize group
proceedings where entities’ COMIs are in the same forum, namely when there is a “grouping
of COMIs.” This solution is quite “hidden” though. In the EIR, it is noted in the recitals and
not in the body of the text.101 The MLG impliedly acknowledges that several group members
may be subject to insolvency proceedings in the same place,102 but it does not pronounce the
concept explicitly.103 Indeed, such centralizations can be attempted pursuant to the existing
Law [UNCITRAL], Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part Three:
Treatment of Enterprise Groups in Insolvency, U.N. Doc.A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.82/Add.4 (Sept. 10, 2008), 11.
97 See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Treatment of
Corporate Groups in Insolvency, U.N. Doc.A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.76/Add.2 (Mar. 6, 2007), 3-4.
98 European Parliament, Report with recommendations to the Commission on insolvency proceedings in the
context of EU company law (2011/2006(INI)), 17.10.2011.
99 Specifically, the report recommended that “whenever the functional/ownership structure allows it…
[p]roceedings should be opened in the Member State where the operational headquarters of the group are located.
Recognition of the opening of the proceedings should be automatic.” The recommendations further provided that
these main proceedings “should result in a stay of the proceedings opened in another Member State against other
group members”, and that “[a] single insolvency practitioner should be appointed.” The centralized approach in
EU insolvency proceedings would have been the mandatory solution whenever the group has been centralized in
terms of its structure, namely the group business was integrated and was centrally controlled. The
recommendations did not preclude the possibility that additional secondary proceedings may be opened, in which
case it suggested that “a committee should be set up to defend and represent the interests of local creditors and
employees” (ibid).
100 Specifically, the report recommended that “[i]f it is impossible to determine which assets belong to which
debtor, or to assess inter-company claims, recourse should exceptionally be had to the aggregation of estates.”
(ibid).
101 Also using “negative” language where it is provided that the rules in the new chapter on groups “… should not
limit the possibility for a court to open insolvency proceedings for several companies belonging to the same group
in a single jurisdiction if the court finds that the centre of main interests of those companies is located in a single
Member State. …” (EIR, recital 53).
102 For example, the relief available to the group planning proceeding (discussed in section III(C)(3)) refers both
to entities participating (i.e., who have their COMI in other countries but who participate in a group process) and
entities subject to the proceeding (see draft MLG, article 19(1)).
103 The revised Guide to Enactment of the MLCBI (2013) (n 80) contributes, however, to a COMI analysis that
supports group centralizations in such manner where it emphasises that the primary factor for determining COMI
is the location of central administration (actual head office) ascertainable by third parties (United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross- Border Insolvency (1997) with
Guide to Enactment and Interpretation with Guide to Enactment and Interpretation (2013), para 145). Often, when
groups were centralized, the central administration of the entities coincides with the central administration of the
group, thus focusing on the central administration factor can result in a grouping of COMIs.
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MLCBI if proceedings are opened and recognized based on the presence of COMI of separate
entities belonging to the same group.104 But the MLCBI lacks explicit provisions on groups and
the application of its provisions in this way is not straight forward and had encountered
objections.105
The absence of explicit provisions concerning the centralization of group proceedings
can result in uncertainty regarding the possibility of opening such proceedings in the same
place or granting them recognition and relief and may lead to inefficient solutions.106 The result
under both regimes might be that with the advance of the new instruments, there may be a
reduction in centralizations based on grouping of COMIs as the emphasis in the specific group
instruments is on cooperation and coordination rather than full centralization.107 Still, as
explained in the next section, the coordination tool under the MLG is stronger and more
“centralization-driven.”
3. Development of a Solution in a Coordinating (Planning) Forum
The main innovation, and indeed important international coordination tool, in both the
EIR and the MLG is the idea of developing a group coordinated solution in a single forum (or
in a limited number of locations) and participation in the solution by relevant group members.
This concept allows developing group solutions, including in circumstances of decentralized
enterprises where group entities’ COMI is in different jurisdictions. A group solution may be
an optimal approach even if the group was largely decentralized but was nonetheless integrated.
Stakeholders can then benefit from the value of the group business or a combined value in
realization of assets. Both the EU and the UNCITRAL rule-makers have, therefore, attempted
104 It is also possible to centralize proceedings under the MLCBI by opening proceedings against group members
in the same place where some of them may have their COMI and some an establishment, defined in the MLCBI
as “any place of operations where the debtor carries out a nontransitory economic activity with human means and
goods or services” (MLCBI, article 2) (see e.g., In the Matter of Videology Ltd [2018] EWHC 2186 (Ch)).
105 See I Mevorach, ‘On the Road to Universalism: A Comparative and Empirical Study of UNCITRAL Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency’ (2011) 12 EBOR 517, 537 et seq.
106 See, for example, the dispute regarding the recognition of foreign main proceedings in the UK concerning a
group member that was part of group proceedings in Croatia, in the case of Agrokor (Re Agrokor DD [2017]
EWHC 2791 (Ch)). The English court referred in its judgment to the possible absence of an option to grant
recognition in such circumstances a “significant hole” but considered that there is nothing in the MLCBI that
precludes it (see at para [53]). See also the circumstances concerning Air Berlin/Niki group decided under the new
EIR, where the attempt of the German representative to concentrate the proceedings against the German parent
and Austrian subsidiary in Germany eventually failed (n [94] above).
107 Cf. the pragmatic approach which was developed whereby proceedings against group members have been
opened in the same jurisdiction, under the EIR 2000 and the MLCBI (see G Moss, “Group Insolvency – Choice
of Forum and Law: the European Experience under the Influence of English Pragmatism” (2007) 32 Brook J Inl’l
L 1005; I Mevorach, ‘On the Road to Universalism: A Comparative and Empirical Study of UNCITRAL Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency’ (2011) 12 EBOR 517, 537 et seq.).
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to address an important gap in the existing instruments by recognizing the enterprise group108
and providing a framework for group solutions and recognition across borders, beyond the
obligation to cooperate.
The EIR allows the opening of “coordination proceedings”109 in any of the courts
having jurisdiction over the insolvency proceeding of a member of the group.110 The court first
seized has jurisdiction over the coordination process (except where there is an agreement of
two-thirds of the insolvency practitioners on the location of the coordinating proceeding).111
The opening request should present the outline of the proposed group coordination112 and the
court should be satisfied that the opening of the proceedings is appropriate to facilitate the
effective administration of the proceedings and that no creditor of any of the group members
is likely to be financially disadvantaged by the inclusion of the group member in the
proceeding.113 Any of the other representatives appointed in proceedings of group members
may object to the inclusion of the member in the coordinating proceedings and shall in that
regard obtain any approval that may be required under the local law (of the state where they
were appointed).114 In case of objection, the group member is not included in the group
coordination proceedings unless at a later stage the insolvency representative decides to opt-in
and be included.115 The “coordinator” appointed in the coordination proceedings may
recommend a group coordination plan,116 which shall be considered by the other insolvency
representatives “[w]hen conducting their insolvency proceedings.”117 The plan proposal is just
a recommendation and it is not binding118—the representatives are not “obliged to follow in
whole or in part the coordinator’s recommendations or the group coordination plan,” they are
only required to “give reasons” for not following the recommendations.119
Coordination under the EIR is, therefore, possible but it is not mandatory or binding as
might have been expected from a hard law instrument. The coordinating court has limited
108 The “enterprise group” is recognised and is defined in both instruments (see EIR, article 2; draft MLG, article
2).
109 EIR, articles 61-77 of Chapter V.
110 EIR, article 61.
111 EIR, articles 62 and 66.
112 EIR, article 61(3)(b).
113 EIR, article 63.
114 EIR, article 64.
115 EIR, articles 65 and 69.
116 EIR, article 72.
117 EIR, article 70(1).
118 It is not ‘an enforceable “European rescue plan” voted on and confirmed on a European level’ (S. Madaus,
‘Insolvency proceedings for corporate groups under the new Insolvency Regulation’ (2015) IILR, 235, 242).
119 EIR, article 70 (2) and (3).
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control over the process: if there is an objection to the inclusion of a group member by its
appointed insolvency practitioner, the member is excluded, provided that the exclusion is
approved by the local court (of the group member’s COMI forum). The exclusion of an
objecting entity is allowed and cannot be overridden by the coordinating forum, even if the
objection is, for example, a “hold-out” strategy aimed at extracting more value than may have
been realized separately (before perhaps opting back into the process) or where the objection
is a result of fear of loss of control supported by local authorities. The excluded entity can be
brought back to the process only voluntarily where the local representative decides to opt-in.
Cooperation with a group plan is optional and discretionary. To compare, the EU Parliament
previously recommended that “[f]or insolvency proceedings in respect of decentralised groups
there should be [r]ules for mandatory coordination and cooperation . . .” 120 As mentioned
above, for centralized structures the EU Parliament recommended mandatory centralization.
In terms of the content of the coordinating plan, the EIR provides that it should identify,
describe, and recommend “a comprehensive set of measures appropriate to an integrated
approach to the resolution of the group members’ insolvencies”. The plan may contemplate
how to “re-establish the economic performance and the financial soundness of the group…” It
may address “the settlement of intra-group disputes . . .” and may contain proposed agreements
between the representatives.121 The focus is on group reorganizations and restructurings. In
addition, the coordinator may mediate disputes, be heard and participate in members’
proceedings, explain the plan to their domestic court, request information from other
representatives, and request a temporary stay of up to six months of group members’
proceedings if “such a stay is necessary in order to ensure the proper implementation of the
plan and would be for the benefit of the creditors in the proceedings for which the stay is
requested . . .”122
The prescribed powers of the coordinator are overall quite limited. They may be
compared with the general powers of insolvency representatives appointed in single company
main proceedings, which include all the powers conferred on the office holder by the law of
the opening state.123 Additionally, the EIR explicitly prohibits any form of consolidation: of
the proceedings (procedural consolidation) or of the estates (substantive consolidation).124 This
120 EU Parliament report (n [98] above) (emphasis added).
121 EIR, article 72(1).
122 EIR, article 72(2).
123 EIR, article 2.
124 EIR, article 72(3).
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prohibition has no clear base rationale that accounts for the economic reality of the group in
question. The prohibition is absolute.125 As such, it shows that it was difficult to reach an
international agreement on optimal tools that adequately respond to different group
circumstances126 within the EIR instrument.127 Instead, the negotiators (on this hard law
instrument) compromised on more limited, soft tools. 128
With the MLG the international community managed to develop and agree on a more
comprehensive, wider range of measures. The equivalent innovation in the MLG to the
coordination proceedings in the EIR is the concept of “group insolvency solution”
contemplated in a “planning proceeding.”129 A group insolvency solution is defined broadly as
“a proposal or set of proposals developed in a planning proceeding for the reorganization, sale
or liquidation of some or all of the assets and operations of one or more enterprise group
members.” The proposal (or proposals) should aim at “protecting, preserving, realizing or
enhancing the overall combined value of those enterprise group members”.130 The planning
proceeding takes place at the main (COMI) forum of an enterprise group member,131 which “is
125 Except where some form of consolidation may be achieved by finding a grouping of COMIs (see Section
III.C(2) above) or through cooperation, and where the domestic law allows for such consolidation (see also recital
61 which notes that member states may develop supplementary rules concerning the insolvency of enterprise
groups).
126 See e.g. the circumstances of the insolvency of the Nortel group, where a pro rata, partial consolidation solution
was required and indeed eventually prescribed by both the American and Canadian courts (In re Nortel Networks,
Inc, 532 BR 494 (Bankr D Del 2015); Re Nortel Networks Corp, 2015 ONSC 2987 (Ont SCJ [Commercial List];
JAE Pottow, ‘Two Cheers for Universalism: Nortel’s Nifty Novelty’ in JP Sarra and Justice B Romaine (eds),
Annual Review of Insolvency Law (Carswell 2015)). See also the agreement on the concepts of procedural and
substantive consolidation in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency
Law, Part three: Treatment of Enterprise Groups in Insolvency (United Nations, New York, 2012),
recommendations 202-210; 220-228).
127 See also S. Madaus, ‘Insolvency proceedings for corporate groups under the new Insolvency Regulation’
(2015) IILR, 235, 247 noting as ”bad news” the fact that the Regulation new rules for groups are only “a very
modest first step” where it “does not yet seem to allow for solutions that make a considerable difference in the
practice of administration insolvent corporate groups. Legal scholars have made a good case for means of
procedural concentration or consolidation … U.S. bankruptcy practice keeps handling group insolvencies of every
magnitude with considerable success along the lines of procedural and, if adequate, substantive consolidation. In
Europe, we have just begun to take the first steps.”
128 See S. Madaus, ‘Insolvency proceedings for corporate groups under the new Insolvency Regulation’ (2015)
IILR, 235, 241 who notes regarding the coordination tool in the EIR that “it can be considered a rather soft
approach intended to incentivise stakeholders more than making them bound to perform specific duties”. See also
C. Thole and M. Dueñas, ‘Some Observations on the New Group Coordination Procedure of the Reformed
European Insolvency Regulation, (2015) 24 Int. Insolv. Rev., 214, 220; G. McCormack, ‘Something old,
something new: recasting the European Insolvency Regulation’ (2016) 79(1) M.L.R 121, 144; 'Insolvency of
Corporate Groups Under the New Insolvency Regulation: Progress or Reason for Concern?'
in Hess/Oberhammer/Bariatti/Koller/Laukemann/Requejo Isidro/Villata (eds.), The Implementation of the New
Insolvency Regulation - Improving Cooperation and Mutual Trust, Nomos/Hart, Baden-Baden/Oxford 2017.
129 Draft MLG, article 2.
130 Ibid, article 2(f).
131 ‘”Planning proceeding” means a main proceeding commenced in respect of an enterprise group member . . .’
Subject to the requirements in the definition, “the court may recognize as a planning proceeding a proceeding that
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likely to be a necessary and integral participant in that group insolvency solution” and in which
other group members participate and a group representative is appointed.132 Like in the EIR,
participation in planning proceeding is voluntary and group members may opt-in or opt-out.133
The planning proceeding may be recognized in host countries where group members have a
presence. Recognition of the planning proceedings is not automatic, but it should be granted
“at the earliest possible time”134 based on objective criteria and the provision of certain pieces
of evidence.135 It is, therefore, assumed that recognition will be swift (“quasi automatic”) as it
has been under the MLCBI.136
Under both the EIR and the MLG, a coordinated solution depends on group member
initiative and agreement. Coordination through any degree of deference to a central forum is
not mandatory and authorities in host jurisdictions are not obliged to go along with a group
plan or postpone a local opening or a local solution in order to consider a group solution. The
risk is that certain group members and their stakeholders will hold out, ring fence assets, and
refuse to cooperate or participate. Local courts may also overprotect local stakeholders and
refrain from surrendering control to the home jurisdiction of the planning proceedings.137
The MLG is however quite far-reaching and comprehensive. It does not limit the type
of solution for the group. As mentioned, a group solution can be any solution. Furthermore, the
MLG grants the group representative the authority to seek a wide range of relief,138 which can
support the development of an effective group approach. Thus, whilst the instrument does not
require participation by group members, once group members decide to participate and local
courts do not prohibit such participation, the group members may be subject to various relief
in the course of the group-wide insolvency process. The group representative may request relief
in the planning proceeding as well as in host countries where group members have their COMI
or other forms of presence. Relief may include a stay of execution and of insolvency
proceedings, entrustment of the realization of assets, and of the distribution of such assets with
has been approved by a court with jurisdiction over a main proceeding of an enterprise group member for the
prupse of developing a group insolvency solution. . .” (ibid, article 2(g)).
132 Ibid.
133 Draft MLG, article 17(3).
134 Ibid, article 22(2).
135 Ibid, articles 20 and 22.
136 See I Mevorach, ‘On the Road to Universalism: A Comparative and Empirical Study of UNCITRAL Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency’ (2011) 12 EBOR 517, 533 et seq.
137 See also I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (Oxford
University Press 2018), 234.
138 Draft MLG, articles 18, 19, 21 and 23.
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the group representative where a local insolvency representative is not able to perform the
task.139
Relief also includes “any additional relief that may be available” under the local law.140
Like the MLCBI, the MLG does not limit the relief and “the court is not restricted unnecessarily
in its ability to grant any type of relief that is available under the law of the enacting State and
needed in the circumstances of the case.”141 There is also no prohibition on a solution that is
based on some form of consolidation. Procedural consolidation may result from participation
in the planning proceedings and from refraining from conducting local proceedings in multiple
jurisdictions.142 The range of relief contemplated in the instrument can facilitate procedural
consolidation, such as the stay of executions and of proceedings, recognition of intra-group
funding arrangement, and any other additional relief that may be granted in the planning
proceeding.143 Stronger forms of consolidation may be required in specific circumstances.144
Such solution and relief, although not mentioned explicitly, may be proposed by a group
representative and accepted by host jurisdictions if the conditions and safeguards are met,
namely if creditors of each participating enterprise group member are adequately protected.145
4. Avoidance of Multiple Proceedings
The MLG provides tools that aim to avoid the commencement of multiple proceedings,
specifically in a group context. It allows treating claims that may be brought in “non-main
proceedings”146 in other states where group members have “establishments”147 centrally in the
main proceedings (in accordance with the treatment the claims would be accorded in the non-
main jurisdiction).148 This follows the mechanism of “synthetic secondary proceedings”
developed in the practice149 and adopted in the EIR concerning single companies,150 which is
designed to avoid the opening of secondary (non-main) in addition to main proceedings
139 Ibid.
140 Draft MLG, articles 19(1)(h) and 23(1)(i).
141 MLCBI Guide to Enactment and Interpretation (n 80) para 154.
142 See Section III(C)(4) below.
143 Draft MLG, Article 19.
144 See Section II(A) above.
145 Draft MLG, article 26.
146 “Non-main proceeding” is defined as “an insolvency proceeding, other than a main proceeding, taking place
in a State where the enterprise group member debtor has an establishment . . .” (ibid, article 2(l)).
147 “Establishment” is defined as “any place of operations where the enterprise group member debtor carries out
a non-transitory economic activity with human means and goods or services.” (ibid, article 2(m)).
148 Draft MLG, article 27.
149 See eg Re Collins & Aikman Europe SA, [2006] EWHC (Ch) 1343; Re Nortel Networks SA & ORS, [2009]
EWHC (Ch) 206.
150 EIR, article 36.
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concerning the same debtor. Adapting this concept to the group scenario, the MLG provides
that where a group representative is appointed, the undertaking concerning the treatment of
claims should be given jointly by the insolvency representative and the group representative.151
It is then binding on the insolvency estate of the main proceeding. Local courts may then stay
or decline to commence non-main proceedings and approve the treatment of local creditors’
claims to be provided in the main proceeding.152
The MLG goes even further and gives legislators the option to adopt mechanisms to
minimize the commencement of multiple main proceedings153 in a group context.154 A
supplement part to the MLG provides that a foreign representative or a group representative
where appointed may give an undertaking, which the court may approve, regarding creditors’
claims that may be brought in main proceedings.155 Generally, and even if no undertaking has
been given (but more so if it has), where a group planning proceeding takes place and is
recognized, the recognizing court, if it is satisfied that creditors are adequately protected, may
in addition to any other relief stay or decline to commence insolvency proceedings regarding
an enterprise group member participating in the planning proceedings. The court may also
approve the group solution and give it effect.156 Such relief may avoid the need to submit the
solution for approval and implementation in multiple countries.
The agreement in the EIR is more modest (softer). The EIR’s framework for group
coordinating proceedings presupposes the opening of multiple main proceedings against group
members and the appointment of multiple insolvency practitioners with no concrete
mechanisms for avoiding those openings and appointments. The EIR provides for the synthetic
proceeding (undertaking to creditors in secondary proceedings) for individual entities. No such
solution is provided for, however, in the chapter on groups concerning main or non-main
proceedings.
The fact that the provisions in the MLG regarding the avoidance of multiple main
proceedings are presented as optional may limit their adoption. Even though the entire MLG
does not mandate participation (i.e. adoption by countries), presenting some of the provisions
as supplemental may suggest that countries should be more careful and perhaps enact only the
151 Draft MLG, article 27.
152 Ibid, article 28.
153 “Main proceeding” is defined as “an insolvency proceeding taking place in the State where the enterprise group
member debtor has the centre of its main interests;” (ibid, article 2(K)).
154 Draft MLG, article 29.
155 Ibid.
156 Draft MLG, articles 30 and 31.
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core text. Even if the supplementary tools are adopted, courts with a more territorialist tradition
may be less inclined to approve such undertakings and to defer to a foreign group planning
proceeding. Courts may feel bound by their local insolvency processes. Yet, the new
formulation in the MLG provides a certain dispensation for host countries to support efficient
group solutions (an international group approach that can benefit the group stakeholders),
including in circumstances of hold-out strategies by local creditors.
D. Summary
The MLG, which, traditionally speaking, is a form of soft law, is in fact stronger than
the EIR, which is regarded as a hard law instrument. Only on the first layer—the agreement to
participate in the international instrument—the EIR (chapter on groups) is robustly harder than
the MLG. But even regarding this aspect, the MLG exhibit certain hard characteristics:
although requiring adoption by countries, it is generally designed as a complete law and it
encourages enactment with limited modifications. Adoption of a model law is also a simple
process.
On the second and third layers—enforcement of the instrument and the agreement on
hard, more comprehensive rules within it—the MLG is almost as hard and, in important ways,
even harder than the EIR. As such, it is more promising. Once adopted, the MLG’s provisions
can be enforced through domestic mechanisms. Importantly, the MLG framework is quite
precise and elaborated. Although, other than a duty to cooperate, the regime is voluntary (group
entities may not participate in group solutions), once group entities decide to participate, they
can be subject to a range of remedies. The MLG provides a wide array of tools that can be
utilized both in the central (planning) forum and in the states hosting aspects of the enterprise
group. Notably, the MLG provides mechanisms for minimizing multiple proceedings. In
contrast, the EIR, a hard law instrument, while indeed binding, prescribes soft solutions for
groups in insolvency – cooperation and a limited coordination tool.
CONCLUSION
Traditional conceptions of hard law generating stronger commitments and soft law
softer commitments are misleading and inaccurate. Often so-called soft law regimes are less
hollow and can generate greater compliance with coordinated international solutions. In the
context of cross-border insolvency, even though the European Union’s EIR is a hard law
instrument, its provisions concerning groups manifest significant weaknesses. The MLG,
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UNCITRAL’s forthcoming regime for cross-border groups, is on the other hand considered a
form of soft law but in important respects it can elicit more robust consequences compared
with the EIR. Once the MLG is enacted it will be enforceable under domestic legal orders.
Then, its wider relief provisions and its potential to prevent multiple proceedings can promote
enforcement of group solutions that can benefit the enterprise stakeholders. For these reasons,
the MLG although taking the form of soft law has more potential efficacy than the EIR’s
provisions on groups and it can be regarded as harder and stronger.
The analysis also highlighted certain specific aspects of the regimes for groups that
require improvement. Both the EIR and the MLG can be strengthened. Cooperation and
coordination can be more than a duty to cooperate and an option to coordinate in a single forum.
Instead, cooperation may be mandatory in order to achieve optimal solutions in given
circumstances, with appropriate safeguards of course. The notion of a group forum can be
further developed. At least the possibility of grouping COMIs in one jurisdiction highlighted
more. In addition, in the EIR, the restrictions concerning consolidation should be removed.
Further, and drawing on the provisions in the MLG, the notion of avoiding multiple non-main
or main multiple proceedings should be developed in the EIR to apply in the context of
enterprise groups, including through expansion of the notion of undertaking given to local
creditors.
